Election Fairness and Government Legitimacy in Afghanistan

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Abstract:

One reason that elections are considered a component of state-building is that they create "legitimacy," in the sense of positive and compliant attitudes of citizens toward government. Are attitudes toward government really pliable enough to be affected by election fairness, in a weak institutional setting? We find that electoral fraud correlates with worse attitudes on measures of both general support for government, and explicit compliance with government including: (1) whether Afghanistan is a democracy; (2) whether members of parliament provide services; (3) whether the police should resolve disputes; and most importantly, (4) willingness to report insurgent behavior to security forces. Moreover, we believe that causality flows from fraud to attitudes because we obtain analogous results when we randomly assign a fraud-reducing intervention in Afghan elections.
1. Introduction
An increasing proportion of development assistance now flows to countries whose
governments lack what political scientists call legitimacy, citizen compliance and
cooperation with governance.¹ That term covers both institutions and attitudes,
but emphasizes the importance of citizens’ attitudes toward institutions in
allowing government to function without incurring the excessive costs of
coercion. These countries lack core features of the Weberian state, such as a
monopoly on violence, and the ability to tax and provide services to the
population. These factors severely impede any process of state-building, and in
extreme cases can lead to “ungoverned spaces” or “limited statehood” from which
non-state groups can threaten local, regional, and global security. ²

Legitimacy may derive from a perception of procedural fairness (Levi, Sacks and Tyler 2009; Tyler 1990, 2006; Paternoster, Brame, Bachman, and Sherman 1997; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler and Huo 2002). Legitimacy may also flow from outcomes -- competent provision of public goods (Bernstein and Lü 2003; Fjeldstad and Semboja 2000; Guyer 1992; O’Brien 2002; Levi 2006).

A minimalist definition of legitimacy, from the state-building literature, is this: an attribute of political authority which captures residents’ acceptance that state institutions have “the right to issue certain commands, and that they, in turn,

¹ Economists generally avoid the term. Dewatripont and Roland, 1992, an exception, use it to mean “agenda-setting authority, over the nature and sequence of proposals put to a vote.” (p. 300), in the sense of Romer and Rosenthal (1979). That’s a mild form, in which the public complies (costlessly) with government bringing proposals of tax, subsidy and reallocation, subject to a vote.
² Although the concept has driven US foreign policy, the term “ungoverned spaces” has a raft of critics. Krasner prefers “limited statehood” which means “those areas of a country in which central authorities (governments) lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions and/or in which the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence is lacking.” Krasner and Risse, p.549.
have an obligation or duty to comply” (Lake, 2010). This definition is especially appropriate for Afghanistan, where state institutions are weak and multiple actors compete for political authority (Lyall, Blair and Imai, 2013). Compliance is particularly important to state-building because it reduces governance costs for the state authority, costs that would be prohibitively expensive if all laws were enforced through direct observation and punishment.

We explore the role of election fairness, one aspect of procedural fairness, in inducing improved attitudes, and in particular compliant attitudes, towards government. Policymakers and scholars consider the selection of leaders through fair elections to be a key part of establishing a legitimate state (Brancati and Snyder 2011; Diamond 2006; Goodwin-Gill 2006; Lindberg 2003; Ottoway 2003; Paris 2004; Rothstein 2009).

Combining survey, institutional and experimental data we report two findings related to the 2010 Afghan Wolesi Jirga elections. First, election fraud (measured by reports of destroyed vote tallies) is associated with both worse attitudes toward government in general, and with less expressed willingness to comply with governance in particular. Second, survey respondents in areas that held fairer elections due to an experimental fraud reduction treatment were both more likely to favorably view their government in general, and more likely to hold compliant attitudes. For example, citizens living near treated polling stations were more likely to report that (1) Afghanistan is a democracy, and, that (2) members of parliament provide services. On compliance, they were more likely to report that (3) police should resolve disputes, and (4) one should report insurgent

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3 When this acceptance translates into actual compliance with an authority’s rules, it constitutes “behavioral” legitimacy (Hurd 1999; Kelman and Hamilton 1989; Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009; Tyler 2006).
behavior to security forces. Experimental effects are strongest among the subsample of respondents not aware of the fairness-enhancing treatment, leading us to conclude that legitimacy was increased by perceptions (near treated polling stations) that electoral fairness was intrinsically better.

This study joins a group of experiments testing outcome legitimacy, -- government service delivery increasing citizens’ support for the government in nascent democracies (Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel, 2012; Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein, 2009, 2012; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2012; Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov, 2012). Separately, several experiments have attempted to improve electoral processes (through monitoring, which is not our method) (Hyde, 2007; Hyde, 2010; Enikolopov et al, 2011; Asunka et al, 2014), generally finding improved electoral integrity. To our knowledge, however, ours is the first to link efforts to improve national elections to attitudes toward government, which we think of as more procedural than outcome legitimacy.

We believe that our finding that electoral fairness affects attitudes is particularly compelling for three reasons. First, Afghans have every reason to be cynical about their governance; the elections were held in a setting fraught with vote-rigging, with what is by all accounts one of the world’s most corrupt and dysfunctional government. So it’s remarkable that attitudes remain plastic, even in that environment. Second, our study challenges the view that Afghan politics is solely predetermined by pre-existing allegiances along ethnic, class, religious, or ideological lines. Instead, these results indicate that democratic reforms could

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4 In Section 5 below, we show that our treatment created significant improvements in two of seven additional measures of attitudes, after adjusting standard errors for multiple hypothesis testing.
5 Grossman and Baldassarri (2012) provide evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment that subjects electing their leaders contribute more in a public goods game and that the same relationship between the perceived legitimacy of authority and cooperation exists non-experimentally in decisions related to the farmer cooperatives to which subjects belong.
have real political effects, even in a country with weak institutions and strong extant loyalties. Third, in this setting noncompliance with the critical need of security forces for information about insurgent activities would be critical to the very survival of government.

2. Framework

The source of legitimacy may be procedural. Consider an election in a nascent or conflict-cursed state, where the legitimacy of governance might be questioned. Proponents of early elections after civil wars argue that establishing elected authorities allows for a more peaceful way for parties to compete for office, thus increasing the possibility that a country will consolidate as a democracy (Diamond 2006). Even if poorly run or beset with violence, elections may allow leaders and voters to begin the practice of democratic choice and ultimately lead to better future elections (Berman 2007; Carothers 2007; Lindberg 2003). The promise of elections may also induce the international community to commit peacekeeping forces and development assistance necessary to help legitimize a fragile post conflict government (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008a; Lyons 2002). 6

6 Despite the important role that elections may serve in establishing legitimacy, the evidence is mixed. Recent research identifies many problems associated with holding elections in post-conflict environments. Brancati and Snyder (2009) find that calling for an election too soon is associated with an increased likelihood of renewed fighting. A quick election may increase the probability that one side or the other will ignore a loss at the ballot box and return to war, or may result in an elected government which pursues policies that impede further reform and instead rekindle conflict (Brancati and Snyder 2011; de Zeeuw 2008; Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Paris 2004). Further, early elections are often fraudulent for a number of reasons, including the interests of those staging the elections, a lack of trustworthy electoral institutions, and the disorganization of the opposition
Alternatively, residents may also confer legitimacy on an authority based on their assessment of outcomes, such as public service delivery and overall economic and political performance (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005; Gilley 2009; Levi 1988, 1997; Levi, Sacks and Tyler 2009; Rothstein 2005; Sarsfield and Echegaray 2006; van De Walle and Scott 2009). To build outcome legitimacy, foreign governments, policymakers, and international organizations concerned with state-building in post conflict areas have demonstrated a strong interest in helping nascent governments establish the competent delivery of basic services to their citizens (Bately and McLoughlin 2010; Beath et al. 2013; Carment et al. 2010; Paris and Sisk 2009; Cole and Hsu 2009). If an authority cannot provide goods and services, individuals may turn to other groups that can, including insurgents, international military forces (especially to provide security), and/or non-governmental organizations (Berman 2009; Brinkerhoff et al. 2009; OECD 2010; Vaux and Visman 2005).

Regardless of their source, attitudes toward government play an important role in other disciplines as well. A well-established phenomenon in public economics is "tax morale" -a social norm of voluntary compliance with taxation, reducing costs of enforcement. A recent survey (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014) demonstrates the importance of the phenomenon. For instance, US firms owned by individuals from low tax morale countries are much less likely to pay their US taxes. (Yet experiments in improving attitudes toward tax compliance have

(Bjornlund 2004; Hyde 2011; Kelley 2011). Elections in societies divided along racial, ethnic, or other social lines are also more likely to produce immoderate campaigns, violence, and breakdown (Snyder 2000; Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). Indeed, Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2008) find no evidence that elections in post conflict environments reduce the risk of further war, and instead should be “promoted as intrinsically desirable rather than as mechanisms for increasing the durability of the post-conflict peace” (471).
yielded mixed results.) A parallel literature in criminology finds that voluntary compliance with law enforcement similarly allows improved effectiveness, especially in a community policing setting (Bayley, 1994, Akerlof and Yellen (1994), Kennedy et al 2001 (p. 10)). The literature on asymmetric insurgency has even higher stakes: it emphasizes the importance of civilian attitudes favoring either government or rebels as decisive in conflict outcomes (Mao, 1937), deciding whether the government will survive at all. In that setting, as in the tax morale and community policing literature, a key policy question is the pliability of attitudes (Berman and Matanock, 2015).

Whether the source of legitimacy is based on procedures or outcomes, and regardless of mechanism, the fairness of elections can potentially enhance it. Elections allow individuals to choose their leaders through a procedure that hews to clear and impartial rules. A well-organized and implemented election – which is inherently public – might signal that the government is more likely to capably produce public services. Moreover, a fair election may select and incentivize politicians more answerable to the public on outcomes. Fairness may play an indirect role, since compliant attitudes allow governance with less (expensive) coercion, leaving more resources to spend on public goods.

We seek to contribute to prior studies by exploring whether the fairness of elections enhances legitimacy by improving attitudes toward government in the setting of a nascent democracy.

An intervention known to be external (and therefore temporary) should not change attitudes. Voters would not confer more legitimacy on their government if they believed that a non-governmental actor, such as foreign election monitors or foreign donors, contributed to fair and competent administration of the election,
since external interventions are unlikely to be sustained in the future. Furthermore, they might also turn to government less for services should they perceive that it was a non-governmental actor that facilitated fair and competently administered elections, since that would provide a weaker expectation that government services are likely to be administered impartially and competently.

To summarize, we construct three hypotheses:

H₁: *Electoral fraud will be associated with worse attitudes toward government.*

H₂: *Enhancing the fairness of elections should induce improved attitudes toward government.*

H₃: *H₂ will only be true for respondents not aware that the fairness-enhancing intervention was carried out by non-governmental actors.*

3. Background to Afghanistan’s 2010 *Wolesi Jirga* election

Promoting elections has been a core component of the United States’ policy in Afghanistan. After the US invasion and the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Coalition forces immediately began developing democratic institutions, hoping to promote stability by establishing a functioning central government that had been undermined by two previous decades of internecine conflict, civil war, and Taliban rule. Soon after the invasion, Coalition forces empanelled a *Loya Jirga* to create a new constitution. In 2005, Afghans voted in the first elections for the lower house of parliament (*Wolesi Jirga*). In 2009, Hamid Karzai won re-election as president amid claims of rampant election fraud (Callen and Weidmann, 2013). General Stanley McChrystal, in an official communication to President Obama requesting troops to support a “surge,” expressed his belief that the failure of the
2009 elections created a “crisis of confidence” in the government, which would ultimately undermine the war effort without more troops (McChrystal, 2009).

We study the effects of a fraud-reducing intervention implemented during the 2010 Wolesi Jirga elections, which occurred amid a growing insurgency and a U.S. commitment to begin withdrawing troops in July 2011. The international community viewed these elections as a critical benchmark in the consolidation of democratic institutions given doubts about the Karzai government's ability to exercise control in much of the country and the growing influence of the Taliban. Despite a direct threat of violence, roughly five million voters (about 37 percent of those registered) cast ballots on election day.

Afghanistan's 34 provinces serve as multi-member districts that elect members of the Wolesi Jirga. Each province is a single electoral district. The number of seats allocated to a province is proportional to its estimated population. Candidates run “at large” within the province, without respect to any smaller constituency boundaries. Voters cast a Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) for individual candidates, nearly all of whom run as independents. 

Winning candidates are those who receive the most votes relative to each province's seat share. For example, Kabul province elects the most members to Parliament (33) and Panjsher province the fewest (2). The candidates who rank one through 33 in Kabul and one through two in Panjsher win seats to the Wolesi Jirga. 

SNTV rules create strong incentives for fraud. SNTV with large district magnitudes and a lack of political parties creates a wide dispersion of votes across candidates. The vote margins separating the lowest winning candidate from the

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7 SNTV systems provide voters with one ballot that they cast for one candidate or party when multiple candidates run for multiple seats. If a voter's ballot goes towards a losing candidate, the vote is not re-apportioned.
highest losing candidate are thus often small. This creates a high expected return for even small manipulation for many candidates. (In contrast, electoral systems with dominant parties guarantee victory with large vote margins, and so non-viable candidates are less likely to rig results.) These strong incentives to manipulate voting were compounded by a weak election commission, which had failed to prevent widespread fraud during the 2009 presidential election. We document clear evidence of election fraud in the experimental sample studied in this paper during the 2010 parliamentary contest.

4. Research design and data
The results in this paper use data from a randomized evaluation of an original anti-fraud monitoring package that we conducted during Afghanistan’s 2010 Wolesi Jirga election (citation redacted), and which we recount here. In this section, we revisit that anti-fraud monitoring experiment as a prelude to our investigation of the effect of that fraud reduction on measures of attitudes.

On election day and the day after, a team of Afghan researchers traveled to an experimental sample of 471 polling centers. Because Afghanistan was an active war zone during this period, we selected polling centers that met three criteria to ensure the safety of our staff: (i) achieving the highest security rating given by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan National Police (ANP); (ii) being located in provincial centers, which are much safer than rural areas; and (iii) being scheduled to operate on election day by the

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8 We stratified treatment on province and, in the 450 polling centers for which we had baseline data (we added an additional 21 to the experimental sample after baseline on obtaining additional funding), we also stratified treatment on the share of respondents from the baseline survey reporting at least occasional access to electricity and on respondents reporting that the district governor carries the most responsibility for keeping elections fair.

9 Given budget and security issues, we could only deploy researchers in 19 of 34 provincial centers. Thus the sample is not nationally representative but biased towards safer areas. Our
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Figure 1 maps our experimental sample.

[Figure 1 about here]

In a randomly chosen 238 of those polling centers, researchers delivered a letter to Polling Center Managers (PCMs) between 10AM and 4PM, during voting. Researchers then visited all 471 polling centers the following day to photograph the publicly posted election returns forms. The letter delivery constituted the experimental treatment. The letter announced to PCMs that researchers would photograph election returns forms the following day (September 19) and that these photographs would be compared to results certified by the IEC. Neither treatment nor control sites would be affected by measurement the day after the election, as polling staff were absent. Figure 2 provides a copy of the letter in English (an original in Dari is attached as Figure 3). PCMs were asked to acknowledge receipt by signing the letter. PCMs at seventeen polling centers (seven percent of centers receiving letters) refused to sign. A polling center was designated as treated if the PCM received a letter (Letter Delivered = 1).

To measure the fairness of the election, researchers also investigated whether election materials were stolen or damaged the day after the election. Our staff were careful to investigate irregularities by interviewing local community members while not engaging IEC staff, so as not to create an additional treatment. We received reports of candidate agents stealing or damaging materials at 62 (13 percent) of the 465 operating polling centers, a clear violation of the law. We sample does however cover each of Afghanistan’s regions, including those with a heavy Taliban presence. See Figure 1.

10 Of 471 polling centers, six did not open on election day. We drop these from our analysis.
11 Results below are robust to redefining treatment as both receiving and signing a letter.
define *Election Returns Form Removed* as an indicator equal to one if materials were reported stolen or damaged by a candidate agent at a given polling center.

We have several reasons to think that stealing or damaging tallies reflects an intention to manipulate the ballot aggregation process. Many of the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) complaints reported in (citation redacted) speculated that the purpose of stealing materials was to take them to a separate location, alter them, and then reinsert them into the counting process. Alternatively, candidates might seek to destroy all evidence of the polling center count, and then manufacture an entirely new returns form at the Provincial Aggregation Center.

The treatment (i.e., delivery of a notification letter) induced dramatic reductions in three separate measures of fraud: the removal or defacement of a required provisional vote tally return form (*Election Returns Form Removed*); votes for candidates likely to be engaged in fraud based on their political connections; and that same candidate gaining enough votes to rank among the winning candidates in that polling station (*Enough Votes to Win Station*). Table 1 reports estimates of the effect of treatment on these three measures, reproducing results reported in (citation redacted). Treatment reduced the damaging and theft of forms by about 11 percentage points (columns 1 - 3), votes for candidates likely to be engaged in fraud (*Provincial Aggregator Connection = 1*) by about 20 (columns 4 – 6) and the likelihood that those candidates would rank among winning candidates by about 10 percentage points (columns 7 – 9). These results represent unusually large treatment effects of the intervention on measures of fraud. They suggest that other types of highly visible

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12 The political connections of candidates were coded in advance. We surmised that a connection to a provincial polling aggregator was a predictor of engagement in fraud. See (citation redacted) for details.
electoral malfeasance (deviations from the counting protocol, early closings of polling centers, etc.) may similarly have been reduced.

[Table 1 about here]

The Post-Election Survey

To measure the effect of election fairness on compliant attitudes toward government, the focus of this paper, we combine the results of the letter intervention with data from a post-election survey which we conducted in December 2010, roughly three months after the election and only shortly after the Independent Election Commission certified final results. Respondents came from households living in the immediate vicinity of 450 of the 471 polling centers in our experimental sample, for a total of 2,904 respondents. To obtain a representative sample of respondents living near polling centers - generally neighborhood landmarks such as mosques, schools or markets - enumerators employed a random walk pattern starting at the polling center, with random selection of every fourth house or structure until either six or eight subjects had been surveyed. In keeping with Afghan custom, men and women were interviewed by field staff of their own gender. Respondents within households were randomly selected using Kish grid. The survey had 50 percent female respondents. Enumerators conducted the survey in either Dari or Pashto.

We measure attitudes toward government using individuals’ responses to four questions. The first two questions (1 and 2 below) probe attitudes that might contribute to outcome legitimacy due to positive attitudes in general; the second two questions (3 and 4 below) measure attitudes directly related to compliance with governance. We use all four questions since any single question is unlikely to fully capture a citizen’s attitudes. While we sought to distinguish between legitimacy related to procedure and outcomes, our specific questions may straddle
the concepts. The survey asks other questions about attitudes to government as well, which we discuss below.\textsuperscript{13}

1. \textit{In your opinion, is Afghanistan a democracy or not a democracy?}

\textit{Afghanistan is a Democracy} is an indicator equal to 1 for individuals responding “is a democracy” to this question. This question could be interpreted by respondents narrowly, in the technical sense of democratic procedures being followed, or broadly as a positive endorsement of government. We cautiously chose the latter interpretation.

2. \textit{Who is mainly responsible for delivering services in your neighborhood (RANDOMIZE ORDERING): the central government, your Member of Parliament, religious or ethnic leaders, the provincial government, or the community development council?}

The variable \textit{MP Provides Services} is equal to one if individuals responding “Member of Parliament” to this question. This question is intended to capture whether or not an individual links service provision to an elected government official, since that provision is important in linking outcomes to parliamentary elections. This question allows us to measure the concept against the specific institution, the parliament, voted on in this particular election. The alternative answer “central government” is more tangentially related to the election, since parts of it are not elected.

\textsuperscript{13} We did not specify these four outcomes in a registered pre-analysis plan, although we designed these survey questions to measure the effect of election fraud on attitudes related to legitimacy. To demonstrate that our results do not reflect selective reporting, we report below estimated treatment effects using all survey outcomes that might measure attitudes toward government. The timing of the survey (immediately after election outcomes were certified) and its’ content (principally questions on attitudes toward government) should also indicate that our intent was to measure attitudes related to legitimacy of government.
3. If you had a dispute with a neighbor, who would you trust to settle it (RANDOMIZE ORDERING): head of family, police, courts, religious leaders, shura, elders, ISAF, or other?

Police Should Resolve Disputes is an indicator equal to 1 for individuals responding “police” to this question. This question reflects compliance with police adjudication of disputes, as opposed to informal dispute adjudication mechanisms (which might include the Taliban). Courts are in principle another relevant institution, but less so in Afghanistan, where they are absent in much of the country. We report below additional results using an indicator for the answer “courts.”

4. In your opinion, how important is it for you to share information about insurgents to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (for example, pending IED attacks or the location of weapons caches): is it very important, somewhat important, or not at all important?

Important to Report IED to ANSF is an indicator equal to one for individuals responding “Very Important” or “Somewhat Important” to this question. The question is intended to measure whether or not citizens comply with ANSF requests for information, a critical component of the ANSF’s ability to provide security to a highly vulnerable and war-torn population.

[Table 2 about here]

Table 2 reports summary statistics for these variables from the post-election survey. The data depict a country with uneven support for government. About 68 percent of respondents view Afghanistan as a democracy, while only 18 percent prefer the police as their primary means of dispute adjudication. 20 percent of respondents believe that the Member of Parliament is responsible for
providing services, while 94 percent respond that reporting an impending attack to the ANSF is important.

In Table 2 we also find a high incidence of electoral malpractice at the polling stations linked to survey respondents. At 13.4 percent of polling stations our staff recorded a report of candidate agents removing tallies (Form Removed). A similar picture emerges from the baseline interviews, collected in August 2010, which we return to below. Our data also include two important descriptors of the environment that the elections were held in: the number of local military events tracked as by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (from their Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) database), with a mean of 2.6; and whether or not the polling station was visited by an international monitor on election day, which occurred in 16.5 percent of the sample (from Democracy International).

[Table 3 about here]

Table 3 reports summary statistics and verifies balanced randomization of our anti-fraud intervention between treatment and control polling stations, using our baseline survey of August 2010. Treatment status is balanced across baseline measures for all key outcomes used in the study including our four key outcomes and the additional outcomes examined in Table 5, which we expect given random assignment to treatment. We find no evidence of imbalance on other measures

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14 Similar to the endline survey, we sampled respondents for the baseline, enumerators were told to begin at the polling center and survey either 6 or 8 subjects. Surveys were conducted in individuals’ homes. Enumerators adhered to the right hand rule random selection method and respondents within houses were selected according to a Kish grid (Kish, 1949).

15 The only exception is that we did not collect baseline data for the “Trust Afghan Government to Determine Guilt” question in the baseline. For reasons of safety, we did not collect identifying
that might be relevant to attitudes, including military events in the vicinity and visits by international monitors.

5. Estimation Strategy and Results

Assignment to treatment is random. So the following equation consistently estimates the effect of delivering the letter (which alerts the polling station manager of monitoring) on our measures of attitudes:

\[
\text{Attitude}_{ic} = \gamma_1 + \gamma_2 \text{LetterDelivered} + \gamma_3 X_{ic} + \epsilon_{ic}
\]

where i denotes an individual respondent, c indexes a polling center, attitudes are measured as described in the discussion of Table 2 above, \(\text{LetterDelivered}\) is an indicator of treatment and X is a vector of covariates described in Table 2. All specifications reflect our assignment strategy, by including stratum dummies as suggested by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009).\(^{16}\)

[Table 4 about here]

Table 4 reports our main results, testing hypotheses H\(_1\) and H\(_2\), which imply that the notification letter should improve attitudes in general, and compliant attitudes in particular. Since assignment of the fraud-reducing treatment information from our subjects so the respondents in our post-election (December 2010) survey are likely to not be the same respondents as in our pre-election (August 2010) survey. The same sampling protocol was maintained across both waves. We therefore view baseline balance on our key outcome measures as an additional indication that the measured treatment effect is not due to pre-existing differences between the treatment and control samples.\(^ {16}\)

Alternatively, we have tried collapsing our data to polling center level averages to create a pseudo-panel of polling centers. This allows us to run a difference-in-difference version of the same estimating equation, but with polling center fixed effects, where the first difference is between treatment and control polling centers and the second difference is between baseline and endline. We find very similar results taking this approach (results available on request). This is not surprising, given the high degree of balance we find on baseline outcomes in Table 3.
is randomized, we are not concerned with selection bias or other omitted variable biases driving our results.

In Panel A, columns (1)-(3), we find that the fraud reduction intervention causally increased beliefs that members of parliament are responsible for providing services by 4.1 percentage points, compared to a base of 17.8 percent in the control group, supporting Hypothesis 1 about general attitudes. This result is statistically significant and robust to the addition of a broad set of controls, as reported in columns (2) and (3) (as expected with random assignment to treatment). Columns (4) – (6) suggest that treatment causes an increase in respondents’ beliefs that Afghanistan is a democracy, though the results are not statistically significant. (As noted above, this may in part be because the question is vague, -- it could be asking whether Afghanistan is nominally a democracy or whether it functions as an effective democracy.)

In Panel B we test H2 on compliant attitudes. Columns (1)-(3) report effects on citizens’ attitude that it is important to cooperate with security forces by reporting IEDs. Treatment increases reported willingness to report by 2.5 percentage points (column (4)) in the specification without controls, and by 3 percentage points in the specification with a full set of controls. Turning to columns (4) – (6), using the police to solve disputes indicates a willingness to comply with formal procedures rather than informal institutions --abundantly available in Afghanistan-- for dispute resolution. Treatment causally increases

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17 For ease of exposition, we restrict our sample to respondents who provide some response to the four questions corresponding to our main outcome and to our question regarding whether they were aware that the monitoring exercise was conducted by outsiders. All specification in Tables 4 and 5 therefore have either 2313 (specifications including polling centers without pre-election survey data) or 2200 (specifications including only polling centers with pre-election data) observations. Results (unreported) are nearly identical removing this restriction, though sample sizes vary between specifications according to the number of respondents providing some response to the question used as the dependent variable.
reported willingness to use police by 2.3 percentage points in the uncontrolled specification and by 3.6 percentage points with a full set of controls (column 6).\textsuperscript{18} Both results are statistically significant, and again support Hypothesis 2, that electoral fairness enhances compliant attitudes.

In summary, the electoral fraud reduction treatment improved attitudes toward governance. Those effects were statistically significant for three of the four measures. Figure 4 summarizes those results graphically, reporting treatment effects and 95\% confidence intervals for the four measures.

[Figure 4 about here]

Turning to other survey measures, we find additional evidence that electoral fraud reduction improved attitudes toward governance. Our survey includes additional measures. Three concerned attitudes in general: “voting improves future,” “trust in government to determine guilt,” and “government does an excellent (good) job providing services.” Two measures asked specifically about attitudes toward compliance: “courts should resolve disputes,” “paying taxes is very (somewhat) important” (as opposed to “not at all” important).\textsuperscript{19} \textsuperscript{20} Table 5 reports the results of estimating treatment effects for these measures. Five of the seven additional measures yield estimated treatment effects in the direction

\textsuperscript{18} The difference in point estimates is partly due to the difference in samples. Moving from column (4) to column (5), the sample is reduced by 18 polling centers and 113 respondents. These 18 polling centers are part of the sample of 21 polling centers in Kabul that we added to the experiment after the completion of the baseline survey.

\textsuperscript{19} For the full text for these questions and a description of how they are coded to create outcome measures see the Appendix.

\textsuperscript{20} We also estimated treatment effects on dummy variables set equal to one when respondents indicate supporting the Central Government, Provincial Government, or local Community Development Council as the unit that should provide services. Consistent with our main results, we find a significant and negative treatment effect for the provincial government, which is appointed rather than elected. However, this may be due just to a simple adding up constraint – since the choices are exclusive-- so we do not report it.
predicted by theories of procedural fairness and public service provision. Of these, two are statistically significant at the 99 percent level, both of which are related to taxes.\textsuperscript{21}

Table 5 also reports treatment effects aggregated across outcome measures. Following Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007) and Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel (2012), we estimate standardized treatment effects, standardizing outcomes by subtracting their mean and dividing by their standard deviation so that all outcomes are measured in standard deviation units. We then create an index which is simply the arithmetic average of these standardized outcomes. We calculate separate indexes for: (i) the four dependent variables used in our main analysis; (ii) the seven additional outcomes reflecting alternative measures of attitudes; and (iii) all 11 variables. Estimated treatment effects on these indices are all statistically significant at the 95 percent level, even after adjusting p-values to reflect multiple hypothesis testing using the method of Young and Westfall (1993).\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{table*}[ht]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Outcome & Treatment & Control \\
\hline
Pay taxes very important & 0.10 & 0.06 \\
Pay taxes somewhat important & 0.08 & 0.04 \\
Pay taxes important & 0.06 & 0.02 \\
Pay taxes somewhat or very important & 0.04 & 0.01 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Standardized treatment effects aggregated across outcome measures.}
\end{table*}

The estimated treatment effect of 0.10 standard deviations for the four primary outcome variables is comparable in size to the estimated effect using the index calculated using the remaining seven measures as an outcome (0.06 standard deviations). In summary, estimated treatment effects using the additional seven measures and indices based on all measures yield results that strongly

\textsuperscript{21} We report estimates using as dependent variables dummy variables equal to one for respondents indicating that (i) paying taxes is very important; (ii) paying taxes is somewhat important; and (iii) paying taxes is somewhat or very important. The third is the sum of the first two. We report estimates for all three in order to indicate the insignificant but negative estimate corresponding to (i). If we remove (iii) from the additional variable index and all variable index the estimates are nearly identical and remain statistically significant at the 99 percent level.

\textsuperscript{22} This method yields Family-Wise Error Rate (FWER) p-values, as described in detail in Anderson (2008).
reinforce the conclusion of Table 4: treatment improved attitudes toward
government in general, and compliant attitudes in particular.

*Does Enhanced Fairness Improve Attitudes if Perceived as External?*

Hypotheses 3 states that the effect of election fairness on attitudes will be negated
if the external nature of the intervention is observed. Our survey asked
respondents if they had knowledge of the researcher team or their actions in
providing the letter treatment. About 11 percent responded that they were aware.
Table 6 repeats the analysis of Table 4, estimating the same equation with an
added indicator variable *Aware of Delivery*, which takes the value one if the
respondent is in the treated sample and responded that they had knowledge about
the treatment. These estimates are *not* experimental, since awareness was not
randomly assigned within the treatment group; nor is there any means to identify
the comparison group in the control sample who would have been aware of
treatment had they been treated.

[Table 6 about here]

The estimated coefficient of *Aware of Delivery* represents the contrast
between the predicted value of the outcome variable for the unaware treated and
that of the aware treated. That estimate is subject to possible selection bias, since
those aware of treatment might have *a priori* different outcomes. That would be
true, for instance, if the aware were keen observers of local politics and were
therefore more cynical about Afghan democracy.

Being aware of letter delivery undermines the treatment effect for two of
the four outcome measures. Specifically, for the outcomes *Afghanistan is a
Democracy* and *Police Should Resolve Disputes*, including the awareness
indicator increases the size of the positive estimated treatment effect, which is now estimated solely using the (distorted) aware sample, while generating an estimated negative effect for the aware sample of at least the same size (columns 1 and 4). While these estimates are not experimental, they do retain their size when stratum fixed effects and additional covariates are added (columns 3 and 6). For the other two variables awareness predicts a statistical zero, so that the treatment effect is statistically the same for both aware and unaware samples. In sum, treatment has no effect on outcomes for two of our four variables for respondents aware that an external actor was responsible for delivering the notification letter. We interpret this as mixed but weakly supportive evidence for Hypothesis 3.

All told, we find strong experimental evidence that the fraud-reduction intervention improves attitudes toward government. We also find weaker supportive evidence for the hypothesis that citizens must perceive a relatively clean election to be the consequence of the actions of a domestic government, as opposed to the result of an external intervention, for attitudes to be enhanced. Taken together, these results indicate that even in a nascent democracy with weak institutions such as Afghanistan, improving electoral fairness has consequential effects on attitudes towards government.

6. Conclusion
We have reported both observational and experimental evidence showing that attitudes toward government are not set in stone. Electoral fraud is associated with worse attitudes toward government, and in particular with less compliant attitudes. Reducing electoral fraud enhances both. These two findings are new to the literature and are particularly compelling given the setting: even in the context of an ongoing insurgency and with an infamously ineffective government rife
with corruption, electoral fairness seems to contribute to state legitimacy in Afghanistan, and, to the extent to compliance protects security forces, it may contribute to the very survival of government.

These findings speak both to policy and to the study of legitimacy in nascent democracies. From a policy perspective, our results reinforce the notion that domestic legitimacy, and therefore the stability of government, can be enhanced by interventions that improve the fairness of elections, an assumption that undergirds the current emphasis the international community places on holding elections in fragile states and the considerable investments it makes to ensure electoral integrity.

Our results are mute on the effectiveness of election monitoring—the most common intervention—as an integrity-enhancing technique. Indeed, we find in passing some evidence suggesting that the design of election monitoring in that Afghan election was unlikely to enhance perceptions of legitimacy, since interventions viewed as external did not affect attitudes. Nevertheless, our results are supportive of integrity-enhancing interventions as a general policy.

Our results cannot provide guidance on how fair elections must be in order to legitimize a government, when compared to the counterfactual of no elections (Hoglund et al. 2009). Electoral processes in these contexts frequently suffer fraud (Bjornlund 2004; Hyde 2011; Kelley 2011), can incite violence (Horowitz 1985; Hyde and Marinov 2010; Snyder 2000; Wilkinson 2004), and may institutionalize former combatants into uncompromising political parties. In such circumstances, staging unfair elections in an attempt to increase state legitimacy may instead undermine it. That remains an important question for future research.

Legitimacy plays a key role in theories of political development. It also deserves some lines in the theory of economic development: the government’s
authority to impose rules is a necessary precondition for taxation, service provision, protection of human rights, enforcement of property rights, and implementation of development programs—including those administered by nongovernmental and international organizations, such as the World Bank.

These findings show that at least some attitudes toward government are plastic: though it may be built on a base of unconditional loyalties (e.g., ideological, religious, or ethnic), attitudes are affected by citizens’ perceptions of the integrity of elections. That mechanism may be due to procedural fairness affecting attitudes directly, or to an expectation that fair elections will induce better governance—outcome legitimacy. Our evidence cannot adjudicate. Future experiments which enhance election integrity might attempt to do so.

Along these lines, future research might explore the cost-effectiveness of electoral fraud reduction in improving attitudes, as compared to interventions that improve other aspects of governance in fragile states. Enhancing policing, justice, health, education, security other basic services should increase legitimacy, according to theories of outcome legitimacy. Yet fraud reduction in elections is a remarkably low cost approach to conferring legitimacy, compared to expensive interventions such as security force assistance.²³

²³ On this note, our fraud-reduction intervention is remarkably inexpensive, and has been successfully replicated in two subsequent elections. (Citation redacted) report results from the first replication in Uganda.
References


Westfall, Peter H. and Stanley Young. 1993. Resampling-based Multiple Testing: Examples and Methods for P-Value Adjustment John Wiley & Sons

Table 1: Effect of Treatment on Fraud - Three Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable:</th>
<th>Election Returns Form Removed (=1)</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Enough Votes to Win Station (=1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter Treatment (=1)</td>
<td>-0.116*** (0.032)</td>
<td>-0.019 (0.190)</td>
<td>-0.018 (0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Aggregator Connection (=1)</td>
<td>22.172*** (2.611)</td>
<td>19.674*** (2.423)</td>
<td>19.670*** (2.423)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treat x Provincial Aggregator Connection</td>
<td>-5.473* (3.264)</td>
<td>-5.649* (3.014)</td>
<td>-5.642* (3.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.194*** (0.027)</td>
<td>0.192*** (0.025)</td>
<td>0.195 (0.140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.0292</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Covariates</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratum Fixed Effects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Observations</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Clusters</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The level of analysis corresponds to the level at which we observe the dependent variable. Columns (1), (2), and (3) report OLS specifications estimated at the polling center level. Columns (4) - (9) are estimated at the candidate - polling station level. Correspondingly, robust (White) standard errors are reported in parentheses for columns (1) - (3) (not clustered since data are already aggregated to the polling center level) and robust standard errors are clustered at the polling center level in columns (4) - (9). Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The “additional covariates” are the number of military events within 1KM of the polling center, whether the polling center was visited by international monitors, and the average response within the polling center catchment from our baseline survey fielded in August 2010 to whether the respondent is employed, years of education, general happiness (1-10), gender, marital status, and age. For descriptive statistics see Table 1 of (Citation redacted).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics:</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed (=1)</td>
<td>0.524</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>2313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>32.571</td>
<td>12.286</td>
<td>2313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (=1)</td>
<td>0.460</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>2313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married (=1)</td>
<td>0.692</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>2313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (years)</td>
<td>7.179</td>
<td>5.387</td>
<td>2313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Happiness (1-10)</td>
<td>4.402</td>
<td>1.707</td>
<td>2313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Provides Services (=1)</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>2313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan is a Democracy (=1)</td>
<td>0.678</td>
<td>0.467</td>
<td>2313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important to Report IED to ANSF (=1)</td>
<td>0.935</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>2313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Should Resolve Disputes (=1)</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>2313</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Elections and Violence: | | | |
| Military Events within 1KM | 2.567 | 7.456 | 455 |
| Visited by Int'l Monitor (=1) | 0.165 | 0.371 | 455 |
| Aware of Treatment (=1) | 0.051 | 0.219 | 455 |
| Election Returns Form Removed (=1) | 0.134 | 0.341 | 455 |
| Votes | 1.386 | 8.313 | 375148 |
| Votes for Candidate Connected to the Provincial Aggregator | 23.646 | 47.49 | 1795 |
| Enough Votes to Win Station | 0.0867 | 0.281 | 375148 |
| Enough Votes to Win Station (Connected to the Aggregator) | 0.447 | 0.497 | 1795 |

Notes: Military event data are from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) database. Data on international monitor visits are provided by Democracy International. Vote counts are from a web scrape performed on October 24, 2010 of the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan website. Remaining data are from our endline survey fielded in December 2010. MP is a member of the national parliament. An IED is an improvised explosive device, generally a roadside bomb. ANSF are the Afghan National Security Forces, including police and military. The survey sample is restricted to the 2,313 respondents who provide some response to the questions corresponding to the following variables: MP Provides Services, Afghanistan is a Democracy, Important to Report IED to ANSF, and Police Should Resolve Disputes.
Table 3. Randomization Verification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics:</th>
<th>No Letter</th>
<th>Letter</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>p value</th>
<th># Control</th>
<th># Treatment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed (=1)</td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td>0.566</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.575</td>
<td>2892</td>
<td>2984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>33.577</td>
<td>33.291</td>
<td>-0.285</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td>2891</td>
<td>2984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married (=1)</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.706</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.815</td>
<td>2892</td>
<td>2984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (years)</td>
<td>6.565</td>
<td>6.462</td>
<td>-0.103</td>
<td>0.699</td>
<td>2891</td>
<td>2984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reg Access to Electricity (=1)</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.607</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>1456</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beliefs:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Happiness (1-10)</td>
<td>4.913</td>
<td>4.949</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.768</td>
<td>2892</td>
<td>2984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dist Governor Keeps Fair (=1)</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>1301</td>
<td>1355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan is a Democracy (=1)</td>
<td>0.643</td>
<td>0.655</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.654</td>
<td>2621</td>
<td>2678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Provides Services (=1)</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.259</td>
<td>2853</td>
<td>2948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imp to Rept IED to ANSF (=1)</td>
<td>0.961</td>
<td>0.956</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.592</td>
<td>2832</td>
<td>2906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Should Resolve Disp (=1)</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>2879</td>
<td>2981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Improves Future (=1)</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td>1339</td>
<td>1367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts Should Resolve Disputes (=1)</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.654</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>1456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying Taxes is Very Important (=1)</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.715</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>1456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying Taxes is Somewhat Important</td>
<td>0.424</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>1456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying Taxes is Some. or Very Imp</td>
<td>0.836</td>
<td>0.826</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.611</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>1456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov. Ext./Good Job of Prov. Serv.</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>1384</td>
<td>1413</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections and Violence:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Events within 1KM</td>
<td>2.690</td>
<td>2.551</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>0.842</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visited by Int'l Monitor (=1)</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>0.353</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the polling center are reported in parentheses. Military event data are from ISAF CIDNE. Survey data are from the baseline survey fielded in August 2010. The sample is restricted to the 2,584 respondents answering positively or negatively about awareness of external visits to polling centers. See Table 1 for explanation of variables and sample sizes.
Table 4: Effect of Treatment on Measures of Legitimacy

**Panel A - Perceptions of Government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable:</th>
<th>MP Provides Services (=1)</th>
<th>Afghanistan is a Democracy (=1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivered Letter (=1)</td>
<td>0.041** (0.021)</td>
<td>0.049** (0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.178*** (0.014)</td>
<td>0.178*** (0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Covariates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Observations</td>
<td>2313</td>
<td>2200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Clusters</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel B - Support for Government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable:</th>
<th>Important to Report IED to ANSF (=1)</th>
<th>Police Should Resolve Disputes (=1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivered Letter (=1)</td>
<td>0.025* (0.014)</td>
<td>0.030*** (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.922*** (0.011)</td>
<td>0.918*** (0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Covariates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Observations</td>
<td>2,313</td>
<td>2200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Clusters</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors clustered at the polling center level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The "additional covariates" are the number of military events within 1KM of the polling center, whether the polling center was visited by international monitors, whether the respondent is employed, years of education, general happiness (1-10), gender, marital status, and age. For descriptive statistics see Table 1.
Table 5: Standardized Treatment Effects for All Variables Measuring Legitimacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Mean in Controls</th>
<th>Treatment Effect</th>
<th>Naïve P-Value</th>
<th>FWER p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Four Primary Outcomes Index</strong></td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>0.101***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Provides Services (=1)</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>0.126**</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan is a Democracy (=1)</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important to Report IED to ANSF (=1)</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>0.114**</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Should Resolve Disputes (=1)</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.096**</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Additional Variable Index</strong></td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.060***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Improves Future (=1)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.417</td>
<td>0.449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts Should Resolve Disputes (=1)</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying Taxes is Very Important (=1)</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying Taxes is Somewhat Important (=1)</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
<td>0.167***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying Taxes is Somewhat or Very Important (=1)</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>0.130***</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Afghan Government to Determine Guilt (=1)</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Does an Excellent or A Good Job of Providing Services (=1)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.259</td>
<td>0.303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Variables Index</strong></td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.076***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Significance levels (naïve p-value) indicated by *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. Robust standard errors clustered at polling center level reported in parentheses. Treatment effects are standardized regression coefficients from a regression of the dependent variable, normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation, on an indicator for treatment and stratum fixed effects. The Four Primary Outcomes Index is the average of four normalized variables in rows 2 through 5. The Additional Variable Index is the average of the seven normalized variables in rows 7 through 13. All Variables Index is based on all 11 outcome measures. Family-wise error rate (FWER) adjusted p-values limit the probability of any Type I errors when considering all 11 hypotheses as a group, and are calculated using the Westfall and Young (1993) free step-down re-sampling method as detailed in Anderson (2008). All regressions use data from 2200 respondents (in 437 polling centers) except: (i) Additional Variable Index 2026 (429); Voting Improves Future 2083(433); Trust Afghan Government to Determine Guilt 2163 (435); Government Does an Excellent or A Good Job of Providing Services 2158 (436); and All Variable Index 2026 (429). Treatment effects for the “Additional Variable” Index and the “All Variables” Index are robust to excluding the outcome measure “Paying Taxes is Somewhat or Very Important.”
### Table 6: Impact of Awareness of International Involvement

#### Panel A - Perceptions of Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MP Provides Services (=1)</th>
<th>Afghanistan is a Democracy (=1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) (2) (3)</td>
<td>(4) (5) (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivered Letter (=1)</td>
<td>0.040* 0.049** 0.048**</td>
<td>0.044* 0.039* 0.039*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021) (0.020) (0.020)</td>
<td>(0.026) (0.023) (0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aware of Delivery (=1)</td>
<td>0.002 0.001 -0.01</td>
<td>-0.048 -0.062 -0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.037) (0.036) (0.037)</td>
<td>(0.040) (0.040) (0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.178*** 0.178*** 0.171***</td>
<td>0.659*** 0.663*** 0.571***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014) (0.013) (0.044)</td>
<td>(0.018) (0.016) (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Covariates</td>
<td>No No Yes</td>
<td>No No Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratum Fixed Effects</td>
<td>No Yes Yes</td>
<td>No Yes Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-value (Delivered = Aware)</td>
<td>0.412 0.298 0.214</td>
<td>0.075 0.047 0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.003 0.068 0.076</td>
<td>0.002 0.113 0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Observations</td>
<td>2313 2200 2200</td>
<td>2313 2259 2259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Clusters</td>
<td>455 437 437</td>
<td>455 439 439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Panel B - Support for Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Important to Report IED to ANSF (=1)</th>
<th>Police Should Resolve Disputes (=1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) (2) (3)</td>
<td>(4) (5) (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivered Letter (=1)</td>
<td>0.026* 0.029** 0.029**</td>
<td>0.029 0.043** 0.047**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014) (0.012) (0.012)</td>
<td>(0.021) (0.018) (0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aware of Delivery (=1)</td>
<td>-0.007 0.008 -0.012</td>
<td>-0.053 -0.059 -0.085**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022) (0.020) (0.020)</td>
<td>(0.038) (0.037) (0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.922*** 0.918*** 0.951***</td>
<td>0.171*** 0.160*** 0.127***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011) (0.009) (0.028)</td>
<td>(0.013) (0.011) (0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Covariates</td>
<td>No No Yes</td>
<td>No No Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratum Fixed Effects</td>
<td>No Yes Yes</td>
<td>No Yes Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-value (Delivered = Aware)</td>
<td>0.376 0.386 0.091</td>
<td>0.095 0.028 0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.003 0.113 0.124</td>
<td>0.002 0.073 0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Observations</td>
<td>2313 2200 2200</td>
<td>2313 2200 2200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Clusters</td>
<td>455 437 437</td>
<td>455 437 437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors clustered at the polling center level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.5, * p<0.1. All regressions include stratum fixed effects. The additional covariates are the number of military events within 1KM of the polling center, whether the polling center was visited by international monitors, whether the respondent is employed, their years of education, their general happiness (1-10), gender, marital status, and age.
Figure 1: Experimental Sample in Afghanistan
Polling Center Name: ……………………
Polling Center Code: ……………………
Date: ……………………………………

Dear Sir or Madam-

Greetings! I am an official election observer with the Opinion Research Center of Afghanistan (ORCA). My organization is providing this letter to collect some important information about your polling center and share it with our main office. Your polling center has been randomly selected from among polling centers in this province.

In our attempts to help Afghanistan have free and fair elections, I will return to this polling center tomorrow morning in order to take pictures of the results for every candidate in every station on the tally sheets after they have been posted.

The information will be posted on a website that belongs to local and international election observers so that it will be used by the people of Afghanistan, the international community, and local and international media. We will also compare the photos taken with the tally certified by the IEC in Kabul.

As recognition that you have read and understood this letter, please sign here: ____________

Thank you kindly for your help and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Haj Abdul Nabi Barakzai

Deputy Head of ORCA

Name and Signature of manager of polling station………………………………………
نام بیکرز رای‌دهی: ____________________________
کد بیکرز رای‌دهی: ____________________________

میلیونیت نظرات 472 بیکرز رای صریح توصیف‌شده کمیپور مسئول انتخابات ناظر اورکا دی را بر عهده دارد.

مپربکرز و برازور (ORCA) می‌توانند در هر خط که از نظرات کمیپور رابطه مثبتی داشته باشند، مطالب‌های تعیین‌شده را با کمک بیکرز را در سایت‌های اینترنتی نشر کنند.

اولین بیکرز ناظر اورکا دی را توضیح داده که اورکا دی نمی‌تواند، در این ضریحه، حرف‌پیوستگی را از نشان بگیرد. این بیکرز ناظر اورکا دی را توضیح داده که اورکا دی نمی‌تواند، حرف‌پیوستگی را از نشان بگیرد.

فردا صبح، ناظر ما یک انتخابات آزاد و حرف‌پیوست در انتخابات کمک خواهیم کرد. یک بیکرز ناظر اورکا دی را توضیح داده که اورکا دی نمی‌تواند، حرف‌پیوستگی را از نشان بگیرد.

به‌هم‌ترا

چهارم میلادی بیکرز

مژون ناظر اورکا

اعدام مرگ در اورکا

یابپیم: ____________________________
Figure 4: Treatment Effects

Note: Brackets reflect 95 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 5: Treatment Effects for all Measures of Legitimacy

Note: Brackets reflect 95 percent confidence intervals.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION

APPENDIX: OUTCOMES QUESTIONS AND VARIABLE CODING

Who is mainly responsible for delivering services in your neighborhood (RANDOMIZE ORDERING): the central government, your Member of Parliament, religious or ethnic leaders, the provincial government, or the community development council?

1. Central government; 2. Member of parliament; 3. Religious or ethnic leaders; 4. Provincial government; 5. Community development council; 6. Other (record verbatim); 98. Don’t know; 99. RTA

The variable MP Provides Services (=1) is a dummy variable equal to one for individuals responding 2. Responses of 98 and 99 are treated as missing.

In your opinion, is Afghanistan a democracy or not a democracy?

1. Yes; 2. No; 98. Don’t know ; 99. RTA

The variable Afghanistan is a Democracy (=1) is a dummy variable equal to one for individuals responding 1. Responses of 98 and 99 are treated as missing.

In your opinion, how important is it for you to share information about insurgents to the Afghan Security Forces (for example, pending IED attacks or the location of weapons caches): is it very important, somewhat important, or not at all important?

1. Very important; 2. Somewhat important; 3. Not at all important; 98. Don’t know; 99. RTA

The variable Report IED to ANSF (=1) is a dummy variable equal to one for individuals responding 1 or 2. Responses of 98 and 99 are treated as missing.

If you had a dispute with a neighbor, who would you trust to settle it (randomize ordering): head of family, police, courts, religious leaders, shura, elders, ISAF, or other?


The variable Police Should Resolve Disputes (=1) is a dummy variable equal to one for individuals responding 3. The variable Court Should Resolve Disputes is a dummy equal to one for individuals responding 3. Responses of 98. and 99. are treated as missing.

Do you think that voting leads to improvements in the future or do you believe that no matter how one votes, things never change?

1. Improvements in the future; 2. Things never change; 98. Don’t know; 99. RTA

The variable Voting Improves Future (=1) is a dummy variable equal to one for individuals responding 1. Responses of 98 and 99 are treated as missing.

In your opinion, how important is it for you to pay taxes to the government: is it very important, somewhat important, or not at all important?

1. Very important; 2. Somewhat important; 3. Not at all important; 98. Don’t know; 99. RTA

The variable Paying Taxes is Very Important (=1) is a dummy variable equal to one for individuals responding 1. The variable Paying Taxes is Somewhat Important (=1) is a dummy equal to one for individuals responding 2. The
variable *Paying Taxes is Very or Somewhat Important (=1)* is a dummy equal to one for individuals responding 1 or 2. Responses of 98 and 99 are treated as missing.

**Let us suppose that your friend has been accused of a crime. Who do you trust to determine whether your friend is guilty: head of your qawm or the Afghan government?**

1. Head of your qawm; 2. Afghan government; 98. Don’t know; 99. RTA

The variable *Trust Afghan Government to Determine Guilt (=1)* is a dummy equal to one for respondents answering 2. Responses of 98 and 99 are treated as missing.

**Does the central government do an excellent, good, just fair or poor job with the money it has to spend on services?**

1. Excellent; 2. Good; 3. Just fair; 4. Poor; 98. Don’t know; 99. RTA

The variable *Govt. Does an Excellent or a Good Job of Providing Services (=1)* is a dummy equal to one for respondents answering 1 or 2. Responses of 98 and 99 are treated as missing.
Section 2: A central problem of political inquiry for millennia has involved the legitimacy of the state (Alagappa 1995; Beetham 1991). The causes and consequences of legitimate government are central issues of political economy and were a focus of enlightenment era political philosophy, which was concerned with nascent democracies.24 In this paper, we seek to build on more recent efforts to examine the empirical aspects of political legitimacy; specifically, we focus on its relationship to democratic elections.

Individuals grant legitimacy by evaluating prior behavior of political authorities (or proto-authorities if a formal polity has not yet been constituted) and then decide whether or not to accept their rule. Scholars discuss several factors influencing that evaluation, but most are related to an authority’s procedural and distributive actions. Authorities can enhance their legitimacy when individuals perceive them to have made and followed rules impartially (Grimes 2006; Prud’homme 1992; Rothstein 2009; Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Taliercio 2004), or can lose legitimacy when citizens judge authorities to have violated procedural fairness, as in cases of corruption (Rothstein 2009; Seligson 2002). Authorities can maintain legitimacy even when individuals perceive an outcome to be unfair, as long as they consider the procedure generating it to be fair. Tyler (2006), for example, finds a strong empirical relationship between individuals’ evaluations of procedural justice and legitimacy in both public and private sector settings.

24 The second Treatise of Government by John Locke provides a classical example of enlightenment era inquiry into the causes of legitimate government.